313074

JPRS-NEA-84-147

1 October 1984

Near East/South Asia Report

SUDAN: NUMAYRI VIEWS NATIONAL

SECURITY THREATS

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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

SUDAN: NUMAYRI VIEWS NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

CONTENTS

NUMAYRI VIEWS NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

Cairo RU'YAH ISTRATIJIYAH LIMUHADDADAT AL-AMN AL-QAWMI FI AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT FI
AL-THAMANINAT [A Strategic View of Threats to National Security in the Middle
East in the Eighties] in Arabic (date of publication not given) 119 pages

[Book by Ja'far Muhammad Numayri, published by al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith [The
Modern Egyptian Library], the Sudanese Socialist Union and the Institute of
Political and Strategic Studies, 119 pages]

[Text] "In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate: Muster against
them all the men and cavalry at your disposal, so that you may strike terror
into the enemies of Allah and the faithful, and others besides them. All that
you give for the cause of Allah shall be repaid you. You shall not be wronged"
[al-Anfal: 60]. God the Great spoke the truth.

Preface

Although I see this study as nothing more than a mere view of threats to
national security in the Middle East area under present circumstances, it is
also a view that is determined by my position as a soldier in the armed forces
of the Sudanese people. It is not determined by my position as president of the
Democratic Republic of Sudan.

The difference in outlook from the two positions is considerable. From the
soldier's position this study is an independent effort that can only be comp-
leted by the independent efforts of other colleagues and by the independent
efforts of scientists and researchers engaged in local, regional and inter-
national strategic studies.

From the position of commander and president, however, the study constitutes the
stock of the president's information and the source for his decisions. This is
what is not fully and definitively available in this study.

Foreword

It was that definitive approach that he sought in his book, "Al-Nahaj al-Islami
Limadha?" [The Reason for the Islamic Course], but he discovered that the study
infuriated many people because of its clarity. He wanted to publish it as a
supplement to a magazine with the byline of a major Arab official. He would then
let reactions to the study take their required course slowly, and he would then

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observe those reactions. He knew that the time would come when truth would not be hidden; he knew it would then be easy to dot the i's and cross the t's.

It was something like a dream that steered my thoughts from the city of Gbadolit in Zaire where I had the honor of accompanying the author in a car traveling through a forest to events the region is experiencing today, this very moment.

What the analyst told me that day seemed to be a passing, unintentional remark about the possibility of the past shaping the future. He told me that the Arab area was about to be overrun once again by hordes of Tatars from the East. He told me about the demise of the Abbasid state with its Arab civilization and its capital, Baghdad, which was overrun and destroyed by the large armies from the east. He said that that was the lesson of the past and the destiny of the future. He said there were no distinctions: the Tatars are the same; the Moguls are the same; their base is in the East; and the Arab Islamic countries are once again their targets.

"The Russians are coming." He made that statement in Gbadolit And now the Russians have returned, or they are about to return.

Although I do not believe that anyone knows the future but God, what kind of a prediction was that prediction which was inspired by his feelings, a prediction that propounded events and forged them?

Then he said, "Nevertheless, I pondered these predictions at length."

I recall one day in Tunisia when I entered into his room with a bulletin that had just arrived from Khartoum. He appeared to be disturbed and when I asked him why he was disturbed, he told me that he had worn the wrong outfit and that he senses that that error was an omen for bad news. I was speechless.

I gave him the bulletin which was headed by news of the sinking of an armored amphibious vessel with its crew. The vessel had sunk off the shores of Tuti island while it was attempting to rescue another amphibious vessel that was on a training mission.

I remember that as the airplane took off from Fes, you lit a cigarette from the wrong end, and you declared then that that was a bad omen too. On the following morning I was told by him that our ambassador in Morocco and another diplomat, who was a passenger with him in the car, were killed in an automobile accident while traveling from Fes to al-Rabat after seeing us off at the airport.

I recall your political predictions: ongoing events in the region and in the world are proving them to be true. The most significant of these predictions are those that everyone is fearfully decrying today after the establishment of sectarian mini-states in the area.

You made these predictions in 1973, and your warnings became clear in 1984. Were they predictions, visions, competent analyses, or all of that? In Gbadolit - you spoke about the Tatars and the attack from the East. What can we do about the

imminent danger of today? We can alert people, explain and reveal matters to them, and we can warn them.

This is what the analyst is trying to present to people in this study in the hope that some might benefit from it.

These were the words of someone who was gracious enough to read this study in manuscript. I believe that he spoke too highly of this study in describing it, ascribing to it what I would not. Nevertheless, I wish to express my thanks to him and to others who helped by talking with me about this study.

A Strategic View of Threats to National Security in the Middle East in the Eighties

Preface

It would be difficult to describe this review as a strategic study of threats to national security in the region. In addition, there are difficulties associated with determining the scope and the extent of the area that is being threatened. This is not to say that determining the geographical area that is threatened is difficult, but rather that determining the simultaneity or the sequence of the area's exposure to that threat is what is difficult.

The reasons for this difficulty have to do with counter defense plans, if there are any, or even with realizing the magnitude of the threat to the various countries in the area.

The gravest and the most influential threat is a universal threat, when the factors attracting it are equally powerful and when possibilities that it will become widespread and pervasive become available. What I am referring to here is the possibility that a complete tactical surprise will be realized. This would neutralize any capability for preparedness, not to mention defense.

If we were to add to that the role of internal changes in the area, and these changes can play a role by interacting with these threats, and if we were to add also the fact that the threats are coming from two sources, one within the area, represented by Israel, and the other from outside the area, represented by the new Soviet strategy, that in turn may not only bring about a tactical susprise,* but—and this may also be said with some reservations—it would also bring about the possibility of a strategic surprise as well.

Despite the fact that the factors which constitute and manifest this threat are interrelated and overlapping, what remains clear are the directions and objectives of this threat. These are directions that produced premises based on

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* A tactical surprise is one whose purpose is known, but whose time, place and equipment are not. A strategic surprise is one whose purpose is not known and whose time, place and equipment are not known either. Nothing is known about a strategic surprise.

foundations that have actually manifested themselves in the area and goals that have actually been formulated in the area as well.

For these reaons this review of threats to national security in the area--it would be undesirably presumptuous to describe it as a study or even as a preliminary study--does at least set forth a number of assumptions that deserve to be singled out and dealt with. This is not to prove that these assumptions are true, but it is at least to deny the assumption that the existence of these threats is being assumed.

This review of threats to national security in the area has also required that priorities for dealing with the threat within the area be rearranged. This affects objective accepted facts, emotional ties and religious beliefs. It also affects the legacy of wars, bloodshed and human as well as material losses that the area has experienced for over 30 years. I am referring to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The mere assumption here that priorities are to be rearranged implies a threat that will follow the new threat or that will parallel or complement it. It is self-evident that the mere discovery of a threat would arouse resistance to it, not to mention an awareness that urgent threats to national security exist in the area.

All these are the difficulties that are involved in simply making this review. Besides, they are difficulties that have to do with the presentation and with its style as well.

It is assumed that the threats to national security we are facing in the area come in two modes. One of them is imminent and is represented by Israel, and the other one is also imminent and is represented by the Soviet strategy. Although the fact that the existence of Israel threatens national security needs no evidence, the Soviet threat that is looming on the outskirts of the area has not yet aroused the same degree of vigilance and preparedness even though there is reason to be vigilant and prepared for both threats from one perspective. In fact, the Soviet threat to the area merits more warning, preparation and action so it can be confronted as the urgent danger that it is. It is at this point that this review ought to begin, not just to introduce it, but rather to confront the psychological resistance to an awareness of that threat. There are historical and realistic justifications for regarding the Israeli threat as an urgent threat in whose shadow any other threat, no matter how large, diminishes in significance.

Second, Israel and Historic Impotence

The magnitude of Israel's threat to national security in the area may be seen from the following perspectives:

First, Israel is a separate entity in the area; it is distinguished by its religious doctrine and its racial and cultural origins. Extreme adherence to these principles is synonymous with that entity's existence and survival.

Second, the Israeli state is a human community that derives its unity from the maternal line in the family. This principle is unlike that which is common in

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other communities where one's affiliation with the native country is patriarchal.

Third, the Israeli state is doomed to biological extinction if it adheres to the notion of marriage within the matriarchal line of the unified family of Jews. The Israeli state would become subject to national fragmentation if this rule were violated and if affiliation with the homeland were to be based on one's paternal or maternal line regardless of one's ethnic origins.

Fourth, the Israeli state within the area is equally distinguished by its educational, linguistic and cultural characteristics. All these are impediments to its interaction with the larger surrounding human community. In addition, it is governed by educational and linguistic contradictions and by the cultural precepts of the Israelis themselves for whom an outside threat constitutes the only cohesive factor. The removal of that threat or its continuing effect over a long period of time will cause the educational and cultural contradictions within the Israeli state to come to the fore, and that would expose Israel to fragmention and destruction from within.

Fifth, Israel's existence within the Arab area was established by force. That force, however, is limited by time. No matter how long Israel lasts, time is ultimately not on its side. Israel's progress in armaments and training will not continue to be effective when balanced against the population density of the Arab area surrounding it. The time will come when any progress in the quality of the weapons and training that will become available to the Arabs around Israel, along with Arab population density, will help do away with Israel.

Sixth, ever since the creation of the state of Israel, the components of its economic existence have relied on foreign sources of funding. The continuity of these sources cannot be guaranteed indefinitely. There is an alternative solution to the riddle of Israel's economic existence. Israel would either have to control economic resources in the area by using its armed military force to utilize those resources in its interests--and that would conflict with universal strategies and is something that Israel cannot achieve militarily--or Israel would have to turn the entire area into one that would serve it in two ways. This means that the area would become a source for raw materials which Israel could industrialize, and it would also become a market where Israeli products would be marketed. This too conflicts with international competition in foreign trade and in marketing throughout the world. Even countries that are strategically allied with each other compete for that foreign trade.

Seventh, the average rate of growth in the area's population has not been and will never be in Israel's favor. The present ratio is 1 to 35. In the future that ratio will increase because of what has already been referred to: Israel's concern with the purity of the race. In addition, the cultural heritage of the Arabs is one that fosters the increase in the human population.

Eighth, Israel is a tactical, not a strategic ally of various parties by virtue of its ethnic, religious and cultural makeup as well as its own ambitions. This means that factors of conflict between it and the world powers in the east and in the west will always come into play. These factors will grow and will ultimately become responsible for breaking relations with those powers or dissolving Israel's alliance with them.

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Thus, Israel's alliance with the countries of eastern Europe that provide it with manpower is undermined. Thus too, Israel's alliance with the countries of western Europe, particularly Britain, is undermined, and so are the strategic objectives of that alliance. Israel's alliance with Britain would be undermined despite the role that Britain played in the establishment of the state of Israel. Relations between Israel and the United States are going through the same cycle: a cycle of vigor followed by one of collapse. This has been particularly evident since increased Israeli pressure inside the United States has begun to create negative effects that are against Israel's interests. This trend is likely to grow, either as a reaction to growing Israeli pressure within the United States or as a reaction to the United States' growing interests in the Arab world.

Ninth, the Camp David Accords have shown that the normalization of Arab-Israeli relations is impossible. This does not pertain to the continuation of mutual hostile tendencies between Egyptians and Israelis, but it rather pertains to the negative attitude Egyptians have toward Israelis and their refusal to deal with them.

What has been noted in this regard is the [discrepancy between the] volume of Israeli tourism in Egypt and the number of Egyptian visitors to Israel, despite all the incentives that are offered.

Tenth, Israel cannot guarantee its existence in the area with the natural and increasing growth of the Arab economy, manpower and military, unless it acquires deterrent nuclear weapons. The fact that Israel would have such weapons will naturally cause a number of Arab countries to acquire them also. It is certain that such a nuclear balance will set two different courses for the Arabs and the Israelis.

As far as the Arabs are concerned, they have no choice but to live under that [threat], despite all its dangers.

Nothing is forcing the Israelis to put up with living with such danger. Most of them do not have roots in the area; they still have relations and roots in other countries elsewhere; these are countries with which they were affiliated before they emigrated to Israel. Their children too are affiliated with these countries despite the fact that they were born and raised in Israel. In addition, the Isarelis place much religious importance on preserving the life of an individual and on the fact that the idea of resurrection is not formulated in Judaism. In addition, there is concern with the continuity and survival of the Israeli race.

Eleventh, the magnitude of the Israeli challenge and the pressure Israel is applying to the security of countries within the area equals the magnitude of the resistance to its existence insofar as the Arab-Israeli conflict is one that cannot be settled. Arab and Israeli cultures are also mutually exclusive.

I've set forth this view of the future of Israel as one that poses a continuing threat to national security in the area. I've set this view in the context of preparations to set forth a view of the urgent danger that is threatening security in the area. This constitutes, as we see, a historical cycle that began

more than 10 centuries ago. The threat has returned once again to play the same role, although it is doing so under conditions whose means are different. It is possible that the outcome of this cycle will be different from that of the first cycle whose effects were more like a passing wave. But the current cycle may set in, and it may last even though the objective in both cases was the destruction of the Arab and Islamic identity of the Arab region.

It is no coincidence that even though the names are different, the threat is coming from the same source, east of the Arab region. The first wave was led by the Tatars, and the current wave is also led by the Tatars. In both cases the source of the threat was the south of the Soviet Union.

Communism and Zionism: Conflicting Theories and Analogous Applications

It is indisputable that the Jewish dream of establishing the Kingdom of David and of rebuilding and establishing the state of Israel has historical roots. However, that historic dream continued to be a historic dream that could not be put into application for numerous reasons, among which are the following:

1. After the years of religious enlightenment that accompanied the Renaissance in western Europe, the necessities of establishing religious states or political states that are based on religion ceased to exist. And that included the dream of establishing a political Israeli state like that which was mentioned in the Torah.

2. With the collapse of the church's control and the decline of its authority in general in Europe, aspects of the political persecution of the Jews disappeared from the scene. This allowed Jews to assume leadership positions in European countries.

3. As the scientific method and the secular trend prevailed over the courses of political, economic and social life in Europe, not only were Jews given a chance to coexist with Christians, but they were also able to lead in the various areas of scientific progress. Darwin led in the sciences; Einstein led in physics; Freud in psychology; and Marx in economics. In addition, hundreds of Jews gained prominence as leaders in the applied sciences.

4. This development in the status of Jews in Europe was accompanied by changes in public opinion in Europe itself. Public opinion in Europe sympathized with the Dreyfus case which was raised by French author, Emile Zola in his literary, legal work, "J'Accuse" [I accuse].

5. All this was accompanied by radical shifts in the attitude of the European church. These shifts went as far as exonerating the Jews from the charge of crucifying Christ.

6. What is attributed to Balfour, the British foreign secretary, is still charged to the economic scales of World War I. Balfour is the one who in 1917 made the well-known promise of establishing a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine. That was a decisive year in World War II [sic]. It was the year when the weakness of the British economy paved the way for Britain's defeat by

Germany and its allies. It was that economic weakness which Britain had tried to correct by having its foreign secretary promise the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine. Britain was trying to get contributions from Jews so it could finance the British war effort. Evidence for this lies in the fact that Britain conspired with the Jews to establish a national home-land for them in the Arab area. At the same time it formed an alliance with the Arabs to overthrow Turkish influence in the Arab region.

7. The British promise to establish a national homeland for Jews in Palestine could have stayed a unfulfilled promise, had it not been for two factors.

One of these factors had a side effect: the Nazi persecution of Jews during World War II. The second factor also had its side effect: the sudden termination by Britain of its mandate in Palestine.

8. Despite the importance of these factors Israel would not have been able to establish its state in the area had the following decisive steps by the Soviet Union and its allies not accompanied [that promise].

A. The number of Arabs was matched by trained and qualified people, most of whom emigrated to Palestine from the Soviet Union and from the countries of eastern Europe.

B. Jewish gangs were armed and supplied with such weapons as were not available to the Arabs who were under British and French occupation.

C. Acting on behalf of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia supplied the Israeli gangs with an effective strategic weapon. It supplied them with bombers that played a most significant role in defeating the Arab forces after the second armistice agreement in 1948.

D. Political recognition of the creation of the state of Israel: The Soviet Union was one of the first countries in the world to recognize the Israeli state even though its recognition followed the announcement that was made in the Middle East. But that was due to the difference in timing.

Despite the importance of the forementioned factors, the most important factor in the establishment of the state of Israel still remains the theoretical, intellectual and ideological conflict between Marxism, as an international ideology that denies nationalities and national entities, particularly those that have an ethnic, religious or cultural character, and Zionism, which is based on religious, ethnic and cultural discrimination.

The strategic importance of the creation of Israel as far as the Soviets are concerned lies in overlooking this contradiction. That not only conflicts with the intellectual and ideological principles of Marxism, but also with the makeup of the Soviet state, which is based on the coexistence of people of different nationalities, ethnic backgrounds and races under one central umbrella.

If we were to add to that the fact that the Israeli state is the first state in the world to have achieved the ambitions of Marxism, even those that the Soviet

Union has not been able to achieve yet, we can reach a number of conclusions. These are [as follows]:

1. Israel is the only country in the world that has established communal settlements and collective farms--kibbutzes and kolkhozes--where there is no public property and where the family as an institution ceases to exist. In Israel children belong to the state from the time of their birth. This has enabled the Soviet Union to realize its ambitious model in an area that most strongly rejects these notions that conflict with Islam.

2. By establishing this Israeli state, whose social model is partly associated with that of the Soviet Union and whose association with the capitalist West comes from Israel's contacts and alliances with the West, the Soviet Union would have also achieved in one state a model which demonstrates that it is possible for the capitalist and socialist systems to coexist.

3. Over the past 30 years the Soviet Union has been able to balance its role in protecting Israel with Israel's role in creating opportunities for the Soviet Union in the Middle East that allow Soviet influence to penetrate the Middle East. The Soviet Union appears to be the ally of the victims of Israel's aggression and a not so serious source for their weapons. This is quite evident in the fact that Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union continue to come into Israel even as some Arabs are intensifying their demands that relations with the Soviet Union be upgraded and tightened to confront Israel.

4. The Soviet Union, which has failed for international political reasons as well as technological reasons to compete with western and Japanese industrial production in the rich markets of the Middle East, has been able to conquer these same markets by becoming a basic supplier of weapons because of the Israeli threat. The Soviet Union has become a basic supplier of weapons to some Arab countries and their armies and to the various factions of Arab political, military organizations as well. What is provocative in this matter is the fact that in most cases the source of funding for Soviet weapons is the Arab oil countries, and these countries do not have economic relations with the Soviet Union. Some of them do not even have political relations with it.

5. Because of the steady course it has pursued in establishing and defending the state of Israel even as it claimed it was protecting some Arab countries from it, the Soviet Union has been able to achieve for itself a political, military and economic presence in the area. But this is temporary.

6. The Arab-Israeli conflict provided the Soviet Union with an outlet to warm waters due to its total alliances with some Arab countries. These alliances enabled the fleets of the Soviet Union to establish a presence in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Red Sea as well.

7. Despite its previously mentioned successes, these successes did not constitute for the Soviet Union solid foundations for the bases it acquired in the area. This was due to the absence of ideological loyalty and total political subordination. All communist organizations in the area had failed to establish an influential presence on the Arab scene. They had also failed to seize total or partial power in any of the Arab countries, with the exception of Aden where their success in seizing power was due to special historical circumstances. The

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' Soviet Union has always been shoring up its presence in the area by stirring up fears of Israel on the one hand and by pushing Israel to attack the countries of the region, on the other.

8. Despite the possibility that opinions might differ on the notion of Arab nationalism, as set forth by Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, there is agreement about the role of Arab nationalism as 'Abd-al-Nasir set it forth. The role of Arab nationalism is to resist, oppose and even destroy the effectiveness of communist organizations in the Arab area. In fact, Arab nationalism can foil at an early stage the ambitions of communism in seizing power in some Arab countries. Arab nationalism can even overthrow communism from power after communists achieve power. Examples in that regard are evident.

--'Abd-al-Nasir played a role in striking a blow to the Egyptian communist movement: he consolidated its fragmentation by forming an interim alliance with one of its factions early in the revolution and by mistreating its other faction at the same time, the Egyptian Communist Party.

"All the leaders of the Egyptian Communist Party were arrested on 27 July 1952. Some of those who were arrested were sentenced to serve prison terms that were not less than 10 years for cases that were pending during the days of the king."

--'Abd-al-Nasir played a role in liquidating the Syrian communist party whose military wing was about to seize power in December 1957 and January 1958. The Syrian chief of staff then, 'Afif al-Bizri was to spearhead that takeover. This was done in the context of the alliance between the Syrian Ba'th Party and Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir with the declaration of unity between Egypt and Syria in February 1958.

--Liquidating the Lebanese Communist Party

--'Abd-al-Nasir led a vicious war against the government of 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim in the name of Arab nationalism. Qasim's government had relied on the Iraqi Communist Party, the Arab communist party with the strongest organization.

--The movement of Arab nationalism, led by 'Abd-al-Nasir, attracted most of the popular support for communist parties in the area, particularly after 'Abd-al-Nasir adopted national liberation movements and opposed direct colonialism in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Aden.

--In December 1958 'Abd-al-Nasir liquidated all the support for the communist movement in Egypt.

--The communist movement in Egypt became weakened in the Arab Socialist Union, and in 1964 it announced that it was disbanding its organizations.

--The public conflict between 'Abd-al-Nasir and his call for Arab unity and international Marxism came out in the open in the historic debate that took place in January 1964 in Aswan between 'Abd-al-Nasir and Khrushchev. This was the debate that signaled the decline of Khrushchev on the one hand and the onset of a process for devising a Soviet strategy in the area on the other.

Despite the apparent alliance between 'Abd-al-Nasir, with his call for Arab

nationalism, and the Soviet Union, with its international Marxist ideology, the Soviet Union was planning a divergent yet complementary policy toward 'Abd-al-Nasir.

The Soviet Union was prodding 'Abd-al-Nasir to provoke Israel, and it was pushing Israel to provoke 'Abd-al-Nasir. At the same time the Soviet Union was not providing 'Abd-al-Nasir with the capability for deterring Israel, and that did away with any awe that he might inspire. That happened in the battle of al-Tawafiq in Syria in 1960 during the unity. Israel shot down 12 airplanes belonging to the United Arab Republic during that battle without provoking any reaction from Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, the commander in chief of the armed forces of the United republic. That incident was one of the underlying factors for the dissatisfaction. The first army in Syria rebelled, and that ended with the breakup of the unity between the two states in September 1961. This was considered the Soviet response to the overthrow of the communist regime in Iraq.

The Soviet Union pushed 'Abd-al-Nasir to expand the circle of his hostilities in the area and among the world powers that are allied with the area through hostile propaganda attacks. It finally persuaded him in 1962 to become involved in the war in Yemen. Involvement in that war meant that Egypt had officially entered an international conflict as a direct party to it, since its forces were located outside its own territory in a strategic area of economic and political importance.

The Soviet Union's objective was achieved with this step, with 'Abd-al-Nasir's continued dependence on the Soviet Union on the one hand and with the Soviets supplying Egypt with weapons on the other. There was a possibility that the alliance between Egypt and the Soviet Union could turn into a strategic alliance.

In 1965 and 1966 the Soviet Union was able to take advantage of some domestic events in Egypt, and it used them to bring Egypt even closer to the social and not just the political identity of the Soviet Union.

In 1965 members of the Muslim Brothers, who had been released from imprisonment after having been arrested in 1954, had light Soviet weapons available to them. At the time when this armed organization was announced, an announcement about another organization was made. [The latter organization] whose aim was to assassinate Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir was led by Husayn Tawfiq who had been accused of assassinating Amin 'Uthman in 1946. Tawfiq had been smuggled into Syria. The timing for the announcement of the two incidents provided an approach for a propaganda attack against conservative tendencies. 'Abd-al-Nasir had then announced that these conservative tendencies represented a right-wing party that the revolution had not been able to eliminate.

In 1961 an isolated incident in the village of Kamshish in the governorate of al-Minufiyah was announced. The incident was surrounded by an intense publicity campaign against feudalism. A high-level committee chaired by 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir was formed to bring an end to feudalism. Thus, 'Abd-al-Nasir's movement, with its relatively balanced political implication, was imprinted with what was clearly an ultra-leftist social character.

11. Despite the mysterious relationship between the Soviet Union and the

forementioned events, the Soviet Union was counting on the repercussions of the broad nationalization and confiscation movement that Egypt witnessed in July 1961. That was followed by the separatist movement which was led by some members of the Syrian army in September of the same year. All these matters are considered indications of changes that were bringing Egypt closer to the structural makeup of the Soviet Union. This was not merely the partial polarization of Egypt's foreign policy under the slogans of non-alignment.

The June War: Where Will this Step Lead?

What remains in the midst of all this is the role that the Soviet Union played in stirring up Egypt's fears of Israel. This role culminated in the outcome of the June 1967 war and in the ensuing defeat. The most outstanding features of the Soviet Union's role are evident in the following:

1. There was a certain assumption or an assumed certainty that the Soviet Union had close knowledge of conditions in the Egyptian army with regard to organization, training, weapons and morale also. This was particularly true after the attrition of the war in Yemen. In addition, the Soviet Union knew for certain the kind of military leadership that Egypt had with 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir, the hero of the Soviet Union according to the title and the medal that the Soviets bestowed upon him.

2. It is in this context that the Soviets' objective in prodding 'Abd-al-Nasir to amass his troops in Sinai to face a possible threat to Syria should be viewed. The Soviet Union then did nothing when 'Abd-al-Nasir closed the Straits of Tiran, and they refrained from commenting--they did not even offer advice--on 'Abd-al-Nasir's request that the UN forces be withdrawn from Sinai.

3. The Soviet Union did not inform 'Abd-al-Nasir about the size of the Israeli army's preparations for mobilization. It did not tell him about the size of the troops that were amassed in the south and about preparations for Israel's air strike, even though the Soviet Union had this information. Evidence for this lies in information the Soviet Union had previously relayed to 'Abd-al-Nasir about the presence of Israeli troops amassed on the Syrian borders.

Despite any assessment of Egypt's and the Arabs' losses in the war of June 1967, its most outstanding and significant results were as follows:

1. The creation of a communist government in Aden immediately after the war was quite bewildering despite the absence of any popular support for it. The popular front which took over power could not be compared in numbers or in effectiveness to the national front which had the support of Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at the same time.

2. There was what may be called a Soviet descent on Egypt. The word, "descent," is the word we can use to describe [the following]:

A. The presence of Soviet experts in Egypt's army reached the level of battalions.

B. The presence of Soviet naval, air and land bases in Egypt was not in itself

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significant. What was significant was the fact that Egyptians were prohibited from entering these bases regardless of their positions or military ranks.

C. The Soviets assumed the task of providing air defense for Egypt's heartland.

The Soviet Union had thus taken Egypt from a state of tactical alliance with it to one of strategic alliance. This is a very mild interpretation of what constitutes polarization in the usual sense of the term, as it is used by the Warsaw Pact countries in their relations with Moscow.

Despite these successes that were realized by the Soviet Union by getting to Egypt, they were not its ultimate objective. To the Soviet Union Egypt was merely a base from which it could reach the Middle East and the eastern parts of Africa and tighten its control over the vital areas of the Gulf with the resources for the future that are owned by these areas, that is, oil.

Egypt, however, which the Soviet Union had marshalled to its side through a defeat that had befallen Egypt, would not realize for the Soviet Union this objective for several reasons, among which were [the following]:

--The geography of Egypt is such that it is unsuitable as a base through which penetration by land can be achieved. To the east Egypt is bordered by Israel, to the west by Libya, to the north by the Mediterranean Sea, and to the south by Sudan. Regarding Sudan, the Soviet Union had partially succeeded in revitalizing the Sudanese Communist Party. It had surrounded it with considerable publicity that portrayed it as the strongest communist party in the area. In addition, the Sudanese Communist Party was made to stand out in the shadow of sectarian, partisan and ethnic conflicts that were then prevalent in Sudan.

Egypt is a country that can influence the Arab world, but Islamic Egypt is not a suitable intermediary through which Marxism as the authority of materialism could be transmitted. Egypt is also a source of cultural influence. However, its Arab identity and its cultural characteristics make it impossible for the country to become influenced by any characteristics other than its own, not to mention serving as an intermediary to influence the characteristics and thoughts of others.

--With its military position toward Israel and its military alliance with the Soviets, Egypt was no longer that power that could be relied upon in the Arab world and used accordingly to influence it.

--As a result of the military blow [it suffered], Egypt had to abandon even what it was calling for socially. In addition, it had to abandon its role as the chief publicist for these social [programs] it was calling for.

Egypt thus established a truce with the traditional regimes in the Arab world, and it realized a kind of shaky reconciliation with Saudi Arabia. Egypt had to deal equally with King Husayn's regime as the regime that paid a price for standing alongside Egypt in the June war and losing more than half its territory and half its population in doing so. In addition, Egypt had been forced to withdraw its forces from Yemen and leave the republican regime there to face its destiny alone, without support.

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Egypt suddenly became aware of its own influence and of its liberation from Soviet influence. It also disassociated itself from the Soviet Union. This happened when the revolution in Sudan broke out. Then, a revolution broke out in Libya: it aligned itself publicly with 'Abd-al-Nasir and proclaimed simultaneously an anti-Soviet position.

Under the influence of numerous checks and balances and despite all the Soviet pressures to which he was subjected, 'Abd-al-Nasir was trying to build bridges of understanding with the United States. 'Abd-al-Nasir's acceptance of the Rogers initiative was perceived by the Soviets to be a deviation on his part that had to be suppressed.

It is here that a new interpretation of the position of the Palestinian Resistance toward the Rogers initiative and King Husayn's regime becomes required. It is required in the context of an assumption that it was provoked by the Soviets under what are impossible conditions for the Palestinian Resistance. Why is that?

This is because the bulk of that position was not proportionate to the power of the Palestinian Resistance or to its capabilities, particularly since the Resistance was inclined to fight with all the West, led by the United States, not to mention Israel. [Consider] the airplane hijacking incidents in September 1970.

This is because the bulk of that position and its inclination were directed against what was left of a state, which is East Jordan, after the West Bank was lost. It was directed against a regime that had just come out of a war with Israel and had fought boldly with the Resistance in a battle against Israel on the East Bank: al-Karamah battle.

Because it was the position of part of the Palestinian Resistance. It was opposed to 'Abd-al-Nasir and its slogans opposed his acceptance of the Rogers initiative.

For all these reasons it is not surprising for us to say that the events of September 1970 in Jordan were directed against 'Abd-al-Nasir more than they were directed [against] King Husayn. Why is that?

These events held 'Abd-al-Nasir responsible for the massacres and counter-massacres that took place in Jordan as a result of his acceptance of the Rogers plan.

These events revealed 'Abd-al-Nasir's inability to do anything about these massacres. He could neither side publicly with King Husayn against the Palestinian Resistance, nor could he side publicly with the Palestinian Resistance against King Husayn. The Soviets would thus be able to complete Israel's mission of destroying the legend of 'Abd-al-Nasir in Egypt. They would destroy his legend in the Arab world and throughout the world as well.

'Abd-al-Nasir died on 28 September 1970. But the truth is that he was buried on that day. The history of his political death, however, at the hands of the Soviets had gone through the following stages:

--'Abd-al-Nasir's partial political death came about when he took the Soviet

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bait and accepted the statement that the tripartite aggression had been routed because of the Soviet warning. This statement completely ignored the effective American role, thereby provoking the hostility of the United States at an early stage. It made the United States feel that it was denied the gratitude it deserved, and the United States thus supported Israel.

'Abd-al-Nasir's partial political death came about when he got caught up in the contradiction of boycotting the communists in Egypt and in the Arab world and forming an alliance with the Soviets in Egypt and in some parts of the Arab world.

'Abd-al-Nasir's partial political death came about when ideas that lacked power collided head on with ideas that were powerful. We are referring to the calls he made for nationalism against the calls that the Soviet Union made for internationalism.

The notion of power here is not that of a material power that is for him or against him, but rather that of actual power which he always derived from his opponents or from those who opposed his ideas.

'Abd-al-Nasir's partial political death also came about when he thought that the Soviets had forgiven him for foiling the plans of Syrian General 'Afif al-Bizri, the communist chief of staff, who almost came to power had it not been for 'Abd-al-Nasir's intervention and his declaration of unity between Egypt and Syria. The Soviets did not forgive him, nor did they forgive his unity, particularly when he backed up this step by overthrowing the communist government in Iraq.

What is curious is that the Soviets were finally able to avenge themselves. They were also able to add a new factor that would contribute to his demise. We are referring to Field Marshall 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir whose carelessness or naivete were factors in bringing about the separation of Egypt and Syria. 'Amir's carelessness and his naivete were the reasons for the June defeat; it was his carelessness and his naivete as well as his envy that were about to bring about the overthrow of 'Abd-al-Nasir, had the latter not anticipated him. It is known that in ideological and Marxist terms 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir was thought to be in league with the parasitic bourgeoisie. He was, however, primarily a tool for the Soviets. He had even been decorated by the Soviets and had been awareded the highest medal for heroism in the Soviet Union.

Finally, 'Abd-al-Nasir died on the 5th of June, and he was buried on the 28th of September. On both occasions the Soviets were present at the scene of the crime.

It may not be useful in the context of this review to provide historical details about events that happened after that period. However, that would place on the record a qualitative change that took place in the Soviets' political strategies in the area. This change took place after two highly significant incidents.

The First Incident

The first incident was the communist coup in Sudan and its failure. The legend about the Sudanese Communist Party being the largest and strongest party in the

area was destroyed. Despite its importance, the incident itself may not have had much of an effect on the strategy of a superpower like the Soviet Union. It was what ensued therefrom that affected the Soviet Union's strategy.

Despite its military presence in Egypt the Soviet Union was not able to take action to support a communist party that had actually taken action and seized power in a country that was not more than 1 and a half hour away by airplane from the Soviet bases in Egypt.

Despite its military presence in Egypt the Soviet Union was not able to prevent Sudanese forces stationed on the front in the canal area from reaching Sudan by means of an air lift that had hitherto been unprecedented.

Despite the military presence it had, even in Sudan, in the form of advisers, the Soviet Union was unable to act as it watched the last 72 hours in the entire life of the communist government in Sudan.

The Second Incident

The second incident concerned a similar decision that was made in Egypt to get Soviet experts out of the country in several days.

Despite the dangers they pose to the prestige of the Soviet Union and to its mid-term and long-term strategies, these events did indicate that Egypt succeeded, despite the Soviets' departure, in declaring the October War and achieving a victory in that war.

This means that the Soviets had to have a new beginning; they had to have a new strategy for the entire area. The preceding had been merely an introduction to that new strategy.

The Soviets and a Strategy of Direct Presence

The results of the Soviets' first departure from the area were shocking to all parties.

The United States was almost shocked by events in Sudan. For several reasons a psychological explanation of the U.S. position may be closer to reality than any other explanation regardless of its importance.

First, Sudan generally subscribes to the framework of western political thought, and the United States had inherited it completely after the collapse of the Monroe Doctrine.* In this context Sudan was seen as a state that followed Egyptian directions at least in its foreign policy. No matter how far its

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*The Monroe Doctrine exemplifies the isolation policy that was pursued by President Monroe who thought the United States should not involve itself in any questions other than those that had to do with the American continent. This principle was dropped gradually with the onset of the economic crisis in 1930. It was dropped altogether when the Japanese carried out their air raid on Pearl Harbor and the United States subsequently became involved in World War II, in the alliance against the Nazis.

domestic practices strayed, and these are governed by geopolitical conditions, north Sudan exerted more influenceon the country than south Sudan, at least in the area of foreign policy.

Therefore the events of July 1971 and the ensuing early demise of Soviet presence in the heartland of the African continent, which is represented by Sudan, meant there was a rebellion against the power that influenced Sudan, that is, Egypt.

Second, the events of July 1971 in Sudan had been preceded immediately by an Egyptian-Soviet treaty that was concluded in late May of the same year. To American and western political thought in general this meant that despite the violent and bloodthirsty nature of the communist coup in Sudan, relations between Sudan and the Soviet Union could become somewhat lukewarm as a result of Egypt's traditional influence on Sudan's foreign policy. However, these relations would not be broken altogether, and there would be a period of time during which the Soviets would be able to rearrange conditions in Sudan in a manner that would serve their interests.

Third, western and American political thought held on to the view they had from this perspective that a strategic shift in Sudan's foreign policy would have to be initiated by Cairo from Cairo and not by Khartoum from Khartoum.

Fourth, a few months after the events in Sudan a draft resolution was proposed at a traditional meeting of the Arab League's permanent media committee. The draft resolution condemned the Soviet Union for allowing people to emigrate from the Soviet Union to Israel.

The significance of this incident lies in the fact that it was initiated by Sudan. It took place at Arab League headquarters in Cairo. Despite the disputes that arose in the committee against the proposed resolution, it was referred to the conference of Arab ministers of information which was also held in Cairo. Although Egypt had reservations about the proposed resolution, either it did not try to block its approval, or it was not able to block its approval by a majority.

This meant one of two possibilities: that Cairo was no longer in a position to influence the directions of Sudan's foreign policy, or that through collusion with Sudan it had allowed the approval of the draft resolution.

Fifth, what followed was Sudan's decision to terminate the services of Soviet experts in Sudan. Months later Egypt made its decision to terminate Soviet military presence in Egypt. That was the decision that was also known as the decision to terminate the services of Soviet experts in Egypt.

Sixth, the U.S. effort in bringing about these changes was not even marginal. Matters had taken such a course so as to foil all American ideas regarding the possibility of removing Soviet influence from the area.

Perhaps what is meant by a psychological explanation for the shock that was felt by the United States because of these changes lies in a sense of disappointment that is naturally felt when the effort spent is not proportionate to the

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results. The premises for those results are rather derived from a will that exists outside and beyond that will which shares the same objectives.

Seventh, this explains much of the mystery behind the U.S. reaction to the Soviets' first departure from Sudan and their decisive departure from Egypt. This was because all this had happened without consultation with the United States; no price for that action had been requested from the United States.

Eighth, the changes that were brought about by the mere independent decision of declaring war in October 1973 meant that the Soviet Union's traditional strategy in the area had been defeated. Although the Soviets were out of Egypt, the war from Egypt's point of view was an offensive one. But when the Soviets were in Egypt in 1967 the war that was fought then was a defensive war. What is more significant is the fact that in the absence of the Soviets Egypt had achieved a victory, whereas it was defeated militarily in the war of June 1967 when the Soviets were in the country.

Ninth, the narrow door from which the Soviets had departed from Sudan and then from Egypt was widened to make room for an effective U.S. role in the entire area after the October 1973 war. That was the role that led to the disengagement agreement and the termination of the military and political effects of the breach at Deversoir. That role was also evident in the first disengagement agreement in Sinai and in the Golan and in the second disengagement agreement in Sinai.

Tenth, there were economic and social changes in both Egypt and Sudan that came along with these events, sometimes simultaneously and other times consecutively.

In Sudan considerable progress was made in development because of Arab and western support in general.

In Egypt the economic liberalization policy was presented as an alternative to economic policies that had prevailed in Egypt since the late fifties. This meant there would be a greater distance between the Egyptian course and the Sudanese course on the one hand. On the other hand there would be a greater distance between the economies of both countries and the economy of the Soviet Union with the well-known social and ideological implications of that.

The New Method in the Soviet Strategy and Signs of the Old Method

In the context of these changes and as a result of them, the traditional slow pace with which the Soviets change policies played a specific role. That role, however, was a mixture of old Soviet policies and the features of a new method.

Angola Was the Propitious Opportunity

This was a national liberation movement whose most important features of success were formulated in Barcelona. As the health of Portuguese dictator Salazar declined, a political and a social awakening was being born. Early signs of this political and social awakening began with a call from a Portuguese general demanding the liquidation of what was left of the Portuguese colonies, particularly those in Africa, and specifically Angola.

Portuguese troops left Angola, and the national regime in that country had to

face the violence and the meanness of the racist regime in South Africa. Because of the ideological ties of some Angolan resistance leaders on the one hand and the sudden vacuum that was created by the departure of the Portuguese from that country on the other, Cuba became an appropriate front for the Soviet Union's return to the African continent. Cuba was an appropriate candidate for that role because of its preparedness and its romantic willingness to adopt the Trotskyite idea of exporting the revolution.

Angola was a target, but it was not the most valued target. Because of its remote location at the southern tip of the continent, it was not suitable as a base from which the Soviets could spread their influence, particularly to the north and the east of the continent. Because of its proximity to South Africa it was likely to become the scene of international conflict between the Soviet Union and the western camp in general. Therefore, a new target had to be reached.

Somalia Was More than Ready for More than One Reason

[Somalia was ready to become that target] because of considerations that had to do with Somalia's national aspirations to achieve what Somalia's leaders thought were that country's natural boundaries. These include territory controlled by Ethiopia and territory controlled by Kenya.

[Somalia was ready to become that target] for considerations that had to do with the balance of power between the Emperor's Ethiopia and the Republic of Somalia.

More importantly, [Somalia was ready to become that target] for considerations that had to do with Somalia's geographical location on the Indian Ocean, its indirect proximity to the Gulf area and the possibility of establishing an organic relationship between it and Marxist Aden.

These reasons and results qualified Somalia to become an alternative site for that Soviet presence which was lost in Egypt and Sudan. Somalia, however, had not learned the lessons of the Soviet experience in Egypt in particular, the outcome of which had been rather considerable interim losses.

Despite the fact that the Soviets encouraged Somalia to struggle with the emperor's regime in Ethiopia, the considerations of both Somalia and the Soviets were different.

Somalia was motivated by a false sense of power that resulted from its alliance with the Soviets. It went so far as to risk amassing its forces on its borders with Ethiopia in the latter part of the emperor's administration. Then after the fall of the emperor's regime it advanced into territory that is considered Ethiopia's.

The Soviets had counted on such action and had wanted it as an interim step that would establish their presence in Somalia. However, carrying this step to its limits, as Somalia had wished, was precluded by Soviet considerations that had to do with the international balance. More importantly, it had to do with political changes in Ethiopia itself.

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In taking this step Somalia's leaders had taken into account their political ambitions, but they had not taken into account the economic situation in Somalia. Political ambitions could have been revived by an alliance with the Soviets and by arming and training experts. However, the Soviets could not do anything about the economic situation, nor did they wish to reform it.

Under pressure from the Soviets or in an attempt to please them, Somalia had allowed the Soviets to build Soviet naval bases on its shores. It was that step specifically that came closer to applying pressure on the sensitive spots in the Indian Ocean and in the approaches to the Red Sea, where the rich centers of oil are located. The entire western strategy depends upon these rich centers of oil.

Perhaps because it wanted to show its good intentions, Somalia had also tried to underscore its inclination to have political ties with the Soviets by issuing some Marxist, social directives.

That led to what was quite a vehement clash between Islamic religious scholars in Somalia and the state. That clash ended in the creation of a huge gap between the regime and the public. It was a gap that could not have been bridged without offering at least some social concessions.

While in a state that was clase to being an awakening, Somalia realized that its ties with its Islamic roots in the area could be more useful than its ties with the Soviets, regardless of intentions, motivations and economic exigencies as well. And in a rare dramatic moment a strange congruity or contradiction in Somalia's orientation occurred.

It was a matter of a few hours' time difference. Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia warmly welcomed Soviet president Brezhnev. Hundreds of thousands of people had been mobilized to welcome the Soviet leader. A few hours later Somalia accepted Sudan's invitation to attend a conference that would work and call for the neutralization of the Red Sea. This means the Red Sea would be liberated from Soviet attempts to control it. In fact, Somalia also participated in the Ta'izz Conference, which included besides Sudan, Somalia, North Yemen and South Yemen.*

All these factors together, however, would not have led to the radical change that occurred afterwards in the alliances, had it not been for the events that were experienced by Ethiopia. As a result of these events Soviet strategy took a sharp turn, and the Soviets shifted the alliance they had with Somalia against Ethiopia to an alliance with Ethiopia against Somalia.

Immediate Presence: Features of the New Soviet Strategy

The effectiveness of Ethiopia's geographical location cannot be compared with that of Somalia. Whereas Somalia is a point on the shores of an ocean, Ethiopia extends along the coast of a sensitive body of water. Whereas Somalia has common

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*. The participation of South Yemen in the Ta'izz Conference marked the beginning of the decline of the fortunes of Salim Rabi' 'Ali, the head of state. Mr 'Ali had represented south Yemen at the conference. The process of Mr 'Ali's declining fortunes ended with a coup against him; he was one of its chief victims.

land borders with Kenya and Ethiopia only and hardly adjoins South Yemen through the Straits of Bab al-Mandab, Ethiopia is in a position to influence Sudan, Kenya and Uganda. Whereas Somalia is almost non-effective as far as the Red Sea is concerned, except in the approaches to the Red Sea, Ethiopia has almost total control over the coastline facing the sensitive oil areas and North Yemen and South Yemen as well.

Furthermore, religious homogeneity in Somalia, which is based on Islam, is a factor that is not matched by a comparable homogeneity in Ethiopia. Thus, no sensitive questions could be raised in Ethiopia around Marxism and its materialistic tendency in interpreting the past, present and future movement of history.

All this explains the total shift in Soviet strategy toward Ethiopia. After being outwardly against it and allied with Somalia and with most factions of the Eritrean Revolution inside the country, the Soviet Union suddenly allied itself with Ethiopia against all those.

Despite their importance these factors were merely justifications for the Soviets' shift from demonstrating their presence through their influence, to having a direct military and political presence in the area. This is a presence that cannot be removed by a government decision, as was the case in Sudan and then in Egypt. The removal of such a presence would rather require a change in the organizational and ideological makeup of the whole regime. In addition, there would be changes whose components would not be readily available. These are changes that have to do with international alliances and relations.

When the ideology of a regime is Marxist and when the organization, training and weapons of the army are Marxist as well, what happened to the Soviets in Sudan and in Egypt could not be easily repeated. The state then becomes a basic party in an international camp that opposes another international camp.

Under such conditions the situation requires that the ruling power be vigorously regroomed so that it can be ultimately installed in office on the firm ground of loyalty through fear or through an unshakable faith in the political ideology, or both. What happened in Ethiopia and its similarity with what happened in Afghanistan may provide evidence of that.

In Ethiopia and Afghanistan the government that carried out the coup was subjected to several successive lethal purges. Although Ethiopia's and Afghanistan's ties with the Soviets differed, both countries had ties with the Soviets. However, it was the relative difference in ideological loyalty that was the basis for what the leaders in both countries were subjected to. Thus, the regime's ultimate form would be based on a foundation of fears inside the country. These fears would be affected by past experiences and by the fear of real or imagined outside threats. These two factors would thus continue to exert maximum influence on the degrees of discipline in the regime's direct relationship with the Soviets, a relationship that would be inescapable and cannot be renounced.

Libya, an Alternative Point

With a leap that is made to integrate the courses and objectives of the new Soviet strategy following the Soviets' first departure from Sudan and their

decisive departure from Egypt, one may follow the steps by means of which the Soviets penetrated Libya and established a Soviet presence in the area. These steps are as follows:

1. Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi was bent on inheriting the Nasirist legacy without comprehending the facts of geography and history. These facts had connected Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir with Egypt and not Egypt with Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir.

2. Despite everything that is being said about Nasirism, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir was merely pursuing tactical policies. Some of these policies had met with success and others had not. The strategic outcome of 'Abd-al-Nasir's experience, however, was precisely the product of his failure to achieve a balance between his alliance with the Soviets and his pan-Arab nationalistic thinking.

3. The most significant aspects of this failure, one of whose manifestations was that military defeat, were attributable in part to 'Abd-al-Nasir's attempt to export his revolution outside his country's borders before it was completed within those borders. In addition, 'Abd-al-Nasir did not take into account the qualitative differences in social, historical and cultural development between Egypt and the other Arab countries.

4. Although al-Qadhdhafi tried to fight 'Abd-al-Nasir during [the latter's] final days, he did not fight with him directly because he considered himself his heir. After 'Abd-al-Nasir's departure, however, al-Qadhdhafi tried to fight with all of Egypt which he regarded as his own personal inheritance. The only thing Egypt had to do was accept his leadership.

5. Al-Qadhdhafi's fight with Egypt and with the Egyptian government early in al-al-Sadat's administration had turned after the October War into a fight with the Egyptian government and the Egyptian people as well. This fight, which was begun by al-Qadhdhafi with attempts to use terrorism to create domestic unrest in Egypt, ended with a declared war that was waged by al-Sadat against Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi.

These stages that were referred to previously constitute the means by which the Soviets penetrated Libya.

These stages began by dealing with al-Qadhdhafi as though he were 'Abd-al-Nasir's heir, and they culminated in an alliance with al-Qadhdhafi against the dangers of 'Abd-al-Nasir's country. In both cases the Soviets were pushing al-Qadhdhafi into more extremist behavior in his relations with the outside world. Al-Qadhdhafi would export revolutions; he would stir up unrest; and he would provoke hostilities [everywhere], from the Philippines to West Africa and from Sudan to Grenada.

In addition, the Soviet Union pushed al-Qadhdhafi into a direct fight with the United States, and the United States stood up to al-Qadhdhafi. Libyan-Soviet cooperation thus turned into a Libyan-Soviet alliance and then into a direct Soviet presence in Libya. That presence became the only means by which Libya could be protected from the dangers that al-Qadhdhafi himself was drawing upon himself because of his actions and the reactions to them.

Therefore, the hostilities that Libya has spread all over the globe reflect not

only how much al-Qadhdhafi needs direct Soviet support, but they also reflect primarily the magnitude of the Soviets' provocation of Libya to involve it in these hostilities.

Libya is a country of 3 million people; it is geographically isolated from its interim allies in Syria and Iran and cannot, except with direct pressure and instigation, become engaged simultaneously in a struggle with France over Chad and in a struggle with the United States over territorial waters and the freedom of navigation for the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. Libya also became involved in matters that affect U.S. national security in Central America, as was the case in Grenada. In addition, Libya played a role in stirring up unrest in East Asia, and it played a similar role in Morocco and in the Arab East.

In the context of all the foregoing, ideas may be formulated about replacing the Soviet presence in Egypt, which has been lost, with a Soviet presence around Egypt. These ideas may be formulated as follows:

First, there would be an effective Soviet presence in Libya with a possibility of extending that presence into Chad. That would pose certain dangers for Egypt through its western borders and through Sudan as well, which would be subjected to danger from its western borders and from its borders with both Libya and Chad.

Second, there would be an effective Soviet presence in Ethiopia, and that would have a direct effect on Sudan, not only because of the mutual and complementary influence between both Egypt and Sudan, but also because that presence would constitute primarily a strategic threat to Egypt and Sudan.

If we were to take into consideration the fact that the Nile is a body of water in Sudan that has many channels, it remains, nevertheless, the only channel of water for Egypt. Since the waters of the Blue Nile constitute about 70 percent of the sources of that only channel, controlling the flow of water in the Sudanese plains that are adjacent to Ethiopia can be done by building lakes and dams for storage. This would constitute the demise of Egypt and Sudan. To say the least, controlling the flow of water would constitute the power to exercise full control over both countries.

Third, as far as the Red Sea is concerned, Soviet presence in Ethiopia and elsewhere is almost identical to the situation with the Israeli forces on the East bank of the Suez Canal before that area was liberated.

Wherever the Soviets can be found on the Ethiopian side of the coastline and all along that coastline into Sudan, that sea would turn into a body of water where traffic may be controlled. Since traffic in the Red Sea means navigation routes to and from the Arabian Gulf and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well, conditions in the entire area would come under the full control of the Soviet Union.

Fourth, access to the heartland of the African continent is synonymous with access to African ports. Thus, control of these ports from a base such as Ethiopia would give the Soviets access through Ethiopia to Somalia, Kenya and the Indian Ocean. Also through Ethiopia, the Soviets would have access to the Red Sea as well. From a base in Libya they would have access to the Arab Maghreb, to the Atlantic Ocean and to the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, they would have access to the wilderness of the continent's interior through Chad, Central Africa and Zaire.

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Cautions and Consequences: Iran Is the More Important Base

Regardless of the interaction between the U.S. role and the Soviet role in bringing about the downfall of the emperor's regime in Iran, it has been established, at least by virtue of the consequences, that both the United States and the Soviet Union did in fact contribute with their actions and reactions to the downfall of the Shah's regime.

The United States played a greater role in that regard.

The United States encouraged the Shah's ambitions to turn his country into the fifth military power in the world after the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. The People's Republic of China would thus be moved out of that circle of comparable powers.

The United States encouraged the Shah to turn Iran into a military power in the area to balance the power of Israel. Iran would thus become like Israel: a police force dominating conditions in the Gulf area.

The United States encouraged the Shah to turn Iran into a weapon by means of which the military and economic capabilities of Iraq would be curbed so that Iraq would become incapable of supporting the resistance on the eastern front in its confrontation with Israel. Iran would thus be able to suppress any tendencies Iraq might have to spread its influence in the Gulf area, either by upsetting the military balance between it and Iraq in Iran's favor, or by encouraging Kurdish separatist movements in Iraq.

The United States ignored the fact that the growth of Iran's military capability in excess of its defense needs would be carried out at the expense of economic and social development in Iran. This is because Iran is a country that imports weapons; it does not manufacture them.

The United States contributed directly to the organization and training of internal security personnel in Iran, the SAVAK. That organization played a serious role in awakening the spirit of rebellion against the Shah's regime as a reaction to the violence of its measures.

The United States did and said nothing about the vast class differences in Iran and the declining standard of living of the majority of the people. This was happening at a time when military spending was growing. This was in addition to the manifestations of luxury evident in the ruling class.

The United States did not realize the complications that would be involved in the major development effort which the Shah tried to impose on the country in the last days of his administration. That was the effort that helped the Tudeh Communist Party and the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization attract large numbers of supporters. Members of these organizations no longer used up all their energies in daily efforts, now that steady salaries had become available to them in connection with these development projects.

The United States hastened to abort the growing influence of the Tudeh Communist Party and the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization by establishing an alternative system to the Shah's regime.

As political unrest among the Iranians began, the United States tried to ride that wave of unrest in a failed attempt to contain it. Former U.S. President Carter announced his dissatisfaction with human rights violations in Iran, and the United States advised the Shah to leave the country.

Amidst successive events in Iran and because of growing Soviet influence on mainstream Iranians, the United States, along with some western countries, proceeded to pave the way for the establishment of a religious government in Iran. The United States and those western countries relied basically on Ayatollah Khomeyni who was living in exile near Paris.

It was the U.S. judgment that the religious regime in Iran would do away with the growing Soviet influence on the one hand and would constitute a barrier to Soviet attempts to penetrate Iran through Iran's borders or across Afghanistan. That was achieved in part. Because of the Soviet reaction, however, that plan proceeded along the following courses:

First, the interim alliance between Ayatollah Khomeyni's regime and the Tudeh Communist Party led to an early confrontation between the new regime in Iran and the United States. This is the confrontation that peaked with the taking of hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. This action was carried out under the influence of the cadres of Iran's Communist Party.

Second, due to the religious nature of the new regime in Iran, relations between Iran and Israel were broken. These relations were replaced by an interim alliance between the religious regime in Iran and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Third, by means of this alliance and because of it elements of the religious regime in Iran infiltrated Lebanon through the Palestine Liberation Organization where they joined the Shi'ite faction in that country. From Lebanon they infiltrated the Gulf area where they proceeded to work for themselves.

Fourth, the confrontation between Iraq and the Shi'ite regime in Iran led to a declaration of war that is still raging. The danger of this war is due to the imbalance of alliances it creates in the area. These alliances would ultimately serve the interests of the Soviet Union. The alliance between Iran, Syria and Libya against Iraq is in part an indirect alliance between Iran and the Soviet Union in so far as it achieves Soviet objectives in the area and direct cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iran. Evidence for that lies in the role North Korea is playing in the war between Iraq and Iran in Iran's favor.

Fifth, with the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran, the range of Iranian activity grew and reactions to that activity were broadened as follows:

A. Iran was posing a vital threat to the Gulf area and to the oil outlets in the Gulf as well.

B. Iran was posing a direct threat to security in the Gulf area through the terrorist organizations that were affiliated with it.

C. By means of these organizations Iran had actually succeeded in dealing painful blows not only to U.S. and western interests in the area, but also to their military presence there. Examples of that follow:

--The U.S. marines' camp in Beirut was struck.

--The camp of the French forces in Beirut was struck.

--The U.S. Embassy in Beirut was bombed.

--The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait was bombed.

--A number of vital installations in Kuwait were bombed.

Sixth, using the Shi'ite organizations that are loyal to it, Iran was able to upset the balance in Lebanon when it recently seized control of West Beirut and forced the multi-national forces to leave that city. That included the U.S. troops. These Shi'ite organizations forced the abrogation of the treaty between Lebanon and Israel, and they upset the balance of the regime that is in power in Lebanon.

Seventh, in addition to all that has been previously mentioned, the terrorist organizations whose personnel are financed and trained by Iran, such as the Islamic Jihad Organization, the Islamic al-Da'wah Organization and others, constitute a vast terrorist movement that is posing threats to the area's stability.

Eighth, Iran's successes in all these areas increased its ambitions to export the so-called Shi'ite Islamic Revolution.

Ninth, there is at least one question that remains without a direct answer. This question has to do with the neutrality of the United States in particular and the neutrality of the western camp in general in the war between Iraq and Iran. This question is being asked despite the fact that this war presented the United States with an opportunity to avenge itself against Iran for the humiliation it suffered when U.S. citizens were held hostage in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran for several months. The United States was humiliated after the American adventurous military mission that was undertaken to rescue the hostages failed. This was the mission that can only be described in terms of a confrontation between Soviet technology and American technology. It was a mission whose end did not come out in favor of the United States.

Tenth, the answer to such a question can be nothing more than an assumption or a conjecture in so far as U.S. and western neutrality in general could have been adopted as an approach to contain the Iranian regime or at least to prevent the further deterioration of relations with it.

This neutrality could be one approach by means of which Iran's military power could be exhausted and its ability to arm, train and organize its forces wasted. This could constitute a unifying factor for Iran's armed forces, and it would enable them to sieze power and do away with the extremist religious regime.

This neutrality could be a way for both Iran and Iraq to spend more on weapons

purchased from the traditional weapons markets in either the West or the East. The advantages to the West would be immediate; it would be able to market the weapons it produces. If the weapons were purchased from the East, the Soviet Union would be able to use the proceeds from the sale of weapons to finance its purchases of American wheat and other products of western technology.

This neutrality could be used to magnify the danger of Iran and its domination of the Gulf area, and that would bring the area closer to the West in search of protection.

That neutrality could be used to abort Iraq's growing military power, which could upset the military balance in all the Arab area by matching Israel's military power, particularly in the nuclear field.

Although it may be too soon to make a serious analysis that would reveal the relationship between the Iraq-Iran War and Israel's destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor, it is certain that Israel calculated the time of its strike so that Iraq would not be able to retaliate because it was totally preoccupied in its armed conflict with Iran.

Iran: the Idea, and the Failure of Success

The ideas of the Iranian method are linked with a general ideology that is based principally on the notion of exporting the message of Islam. Regardless of the soundness of this method in religious terms and from the perspective of Islam, the Shi'ite tendency in Iran has acquired a number of characteristics that distinguish it from being a mere independent religious effort. When Shi'ism began to spread, it was the product of a political dispute between Mu'awiyah ibn Abu Sufyan and 'Ali ibn Abu Talib. Geographically, Shi'ism split up the first Islamic state in so far as it was a confrontation between one part of it that was subject to the Persian Empire before Islam and another part that was subject to the Roman Empire, also before Islam.

Historical and geographical differences alone were not the product of the conflict between 'Ali ibn Abu Talib, whose country extended its influence from the Arabian Peninsula to Iraq, Yemen and Egypt, and Mu`awiyah ibn Abu Sufyan whose influence was concentrated in Syria. The most important difference was the fact that what had been appropriated from the Romans were territories that had been subject to the Roman Empire, but what had been appropriated from the Persians was the Persian Empire itself.

This difference may explain the dominance of Arab culture as Islam spread in what were previously the possessions of the Roman Empire. At the same time Arab culture failed, despite the spread of Islam, to become prevalent in Persia after it became an Islamic country. Arab culture failed to prevail in Persia even though it did prevail in the possessions of the Persian Empire like Iraq.

In the context of this distinction Iran's religious denomination may be viewed not only as a religious denomination, but also as an ethnic and cultural denomination that preserved its distinguishing features as well as its ambitions.

On the one hand it preserved its linguistic, educational and cultural characteristics, and it preserved its ambitions to regain the subordinate countries it

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had lost with the Islamic conquest. These countries are primarily based in the Gulf area, and they include Iraq, of course.

Persian nationalism thus continued to hide behind Shi'ism in its conflict with Arab nationalism and Arab culture. In fact, this was how Iran's Shi'ism acquired the legitimacy to fan out and establish control over surrounding areas, not in the name of ethnicity, culture and regaining the lost glory of the Persians, but rather to spread the message, to champion the ideas and to raise the banner of a faction.

This may explain the nature of the conflicting relationship between the Shah and the Shi'ite imams in his country. It is a relationship that is based on tension because it conflicts with the idea that Shi'ite imams have a divine right to exercise authority at a time when the emperor's regime was relying on Shi'ism to spread its influence over the neighboring area, an area that was seen as part of the Persian Empire.

This may also explain the apparent insistence of Shi'ite imams and their followers in Iran on Islam as doctrine even while they insist on a language and a culture other than that of the Koran.

Among the salient signs of the courses of Shi'ism in Iran are [the following]:

--Shi'ites in Iran came out with independent opinions on some Islamic rituals and systems of government that were farther away, not closer to the essence of Islam. In addition, Islam rejects the notion of a divine authority on earth.

--Shi'ites in Iran were fanatic about Persian culture and the Persian language even though the Persian language uses the Arabic alphabet and despite the fact that some Persians, such as Abu al-Usud al-Da'uli, Sibawayh and others, did excel in describing and recording the Arabic language with precision.

--Politically, the Shi'ites in Iran were among the pillars of the Abbasid state with its purely Arab symbols. Nevertheless, they were not fully loyal to that state, and evidence for that lies in what has come to be known as the disaster of the Barmakids during the administration of al-Rashid.

We conclude from all this that the characteristics of Shi'ism in Iran indicate that Shi'ism has its distinguished cultural, ethnic and linguistic character. It aspires to dominate and to become widespread and supreme. In fact, we can almost say that it has a tendency that has never abated to avenge itself against the Arabs after the famous battle of al-Qadisiyah.

This digression into the historical background may be justified by the time gap which has not been taken into account in the success of the Khomeyni movement in Iran and its direct tendency to export its message outside its borders. Khomeyni's movement has exported its message directly to the sphere of its historical influence in Iraq and in the Gulf. In addition, it has been partially successful in achieving stunning successes beyond its own borders. These are as follows:

--Khomeyni's movement took U.S. hostages in the American Embassy in Tehran, and that had a direct effect on the U.S. presidential elections at the end of the term of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

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--Khomeyni's movement formed a close relationship with the Palestinian Revolution in its early days. Then it allied itself with the moderate factions of the Resistance, which are represented by Fatah, and then it shifted to an alliance with the inconstant factions that have ties with Syria, al-Sa'iqah.

--Khomeyni's movement allied itself with Syria despite the assumed hostility between a regime that represses the Islamic movement in its country with unprecedented violence and a regime that came into being proclaiming the slogans of an Islamic revolution.

--Khomeyni's movement became engaged in a conflict with Iraq. This is a conflict that was initiated by the Iranian regime with advanced attacks into Iraq and inside Baghdad. In addition, Iran encouraged the separatist Kurdish movement before Iraq declared its defensive war against Iran.

--There is evidence of unity among extremists in the area despite profound ideological differences among them. These extremists are represented by Syria, Libya and Iran.

--There is evidence of the successes that were achieved by Iranian organizations in Lebanon, Kuwait and Bahrain. Not only are these successes manifested in the penetration of local security boundaries in these countries, but they are also manifested in compromising the power symbols of American and European protection in the area: the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, the marines' camp in Beirut and the camp of the French troops in Beirut.

--There is evidence of a sudden upset in the balance of powers in Lebanon: this culminated not only in Lebanese Shi'ites gaining control over West Beirut, but it also led to the withdrawal of the multi-national forces from Beirut, including the forces of France. The chronic conflict in Lebanon turned from a sectarian struggle to a struggle between all Christian factions and all Muslim factions.

--There is evidence of a romantic shift in the makeup of Lebanon's national army. This is a result of the activities of Shi'ite organizations loyal to Iran. Lebanon's national army turned from a national army into several sectarian militias, with the Christian segment of that army still loyal to the legitimate government that is represented by the Maronite Christian, Amin al-Jumayyil. Shi'ites and Druze soldiers in the army turned to a Lebanese Shi'ite organization that emerged for the first time as a power. That Shi'ite organization was able to control the more important section of Beirut, which is West Beirut.

--There is evidence that Shi'ite leaders in Lebanon succeeded at least in forcing the president of Lebanon to declare that he would withdraw from the Israeli-Lebanese agreement despite American guarantees for that agreement and also despite the presence of Israel in south Lebanon and the presence of the multi-national forces on the shores of Beirut and in that city.

Iran: from Independence to Alignment

On the surface the Nasirist experience, with its nationalistic fronts and its

tendencies to export revolution, is almost identical to the Khomeyni experience and its fronts with their Shi'ite message and the actions they take to export that message. That [similarity] leads one to expect Iran to rush headlong into the same course [that was pursued by 'Abd-al-Nasir's Egypt], but with significant differences.

'Abd-al-Nasir was able to export his revolution primarily by utilizing a competent publicity mechanism. In addition, the scale of his intervention in other countries was limited. In Yemen, he did intervene directly, but his interventions elsewhere did not go beyond financing, organizing and supplying weapons on a limited scale.

Although 'Abd-al-Nasir was able to export his message outside the borders of his country, his success was that of a moving force and an instigator of tensions that did in fact exist in a number of areas: Algeria, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. Although he was completely successful in some of these locations and partially successful in others, 'Abd-al-Nasir also encountered failure even as he met with success.

--The Algerian Revolution succeeded because of his support. Immediately after that success, however, it overthrew its historical leader, Ahmed Ben Bella, because of his ties with 'Abd-al-Nasir.

--The Iraqi Revolution succeeded because of his message. But then its success signaled a shift from pan-Arabism to internationalism: from an alliance with 'Abd-al-Nasir to hostility against 'Abd-al-Nasir.

--The impact of the failure of unity between Egypt and Syria was considerably greater than the glitter of its success. While unity between Egypt and Syria constituted hope for Arab unity, the model for that unity had failed and had simultaneously undermined the idea of unity itself.

--The liberation movement in South Yemen declared it was splitting with the pan-Arab movement that was led by 'Abd-al-Nasir on the same day it announced its victory.

Representing both a threat to western interests and a safeguard for them in the area, 'Abd-al-Nasir did nevertheless provide a way by means of which domestic forces loyal to the West would assail each other and the West itself, represented by Israel. 'Abd-al-Nasir was thus gradually forced to seek protection and to strengthen his relations with the Soviet Union. These relations reached the point of turning into a strategic alliance and a direct Soviet military presence in Egypt, particularly after the defeat of June 1967.

With Regard to Iran

The successes achieved by Iran will undoubtedly stimulate its historical tendency to dominate the area while claiming to export the message. However, the courses Iran will pursue in that direction will necessarily differ from those pursued by 'Abd-al-Nasir for the following reasons:

First, Iran is not only moving toward positions that are somewhat sensitive to economic growth in the countries of western Europe, Japan and the United States, but it is also taking action in a manner that could bring economic activity in those countries to a total standstill. These countries rely on oil from the Gulf, the source of about 80 percent of their supplies, as is the case with Japan. The countries of western Europe receive between 60, 50 and 40 percent of their oil from the Gulf.

Second, Iran is moving toward the outlets of oil and international trade in the Straits of Hormuz. Controlling the Straits of Hormuz would constitute not only economic burdens, but strategic dangers that would go beyond the area. This is because the Straits of Hormuz are considered one of the scenes of international conflict.

Third, the Iranian Shi'ite movement is in fact a process of stirring the burning embers that are still glowing despite the passage of centuries. If these embers were to turn to flames, that would mean breakups which would upset the map of the area from the ocean to the Gulf. The only exception would be the homogeneous Sunni entity in both Egypt and Sudan.

Fourth, the nature of Iran's Shi'ite message is international in its orientation. It is by nature an emotional message that can be carried over the borders by small groups that are prepared to accept it and work under its banner in different and sensitive parts of the area.

Fifth, the area that is being eyed for domination by Iran is not merely an area that is the source of raw materials, including oil, but it is also a network that has become implicated in universal economic interests. This means that the mere arousal of its fears would bring that area to a total standstill. It would completely paralyze the branches of these interests within the area or their main offices outside it.

Sixth, what has been achieved by Iran's Shi'ite movement so far could not have been achieved successfully by the Soviet Union had it had in the area scores of active communist parties resisting the domination of major western powers, forcing them to withdraw and preventing them from taking any initiatives.

Seventh, what has saved Israel's life ever since its creation has been the fact that it is a state based on religion. As such, it confronts states that fight it but not in the name of that religion. Therefore, Israel confronts hesitation with fearlessness and caution with taking risks.

If Iran's version of Shi'ism becomes widespread, regardless of its congruity or incongruity with the essence of Islam, Israel may face for the first time a religious war that will be reinforced by a desire for martyrdom.

It is therefore expected that while it is on its present course, Iran will face only one alternative.

--It can continue its tendency to export the revolution by terror or direct warfare since it is impossible for it to withdraw from that tendency because of the nature of the ideology on which the country's course is based.

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--Otherwise, Iran would have to endure hostile reactions to it. At first, these would be reactions in self-defense, but they would ultimately become offensive.

And it is here that the old-new role of the Soviet Union would emerge.

The Soviet Union would play both a direct and an indirect role in fostering the spirit of adventurism in both the regime and government in Iran. It would encourage Iran futher to export its message. It would then play its expected role as an irreplaceable ally who would confront the expected or rather the inevitable reactions to the growing dangers of Iran's activities outside its borders.

The Soviet Union will be assisted in achieving that objective by the following:

1. Geographical proximity with Iran: it has common borders with Iran in the south.

2. Geographical proximity between Iran and Afghanistan in the shadow of the Soviet model which is manifested in Afghanistan.

3. In the case of unlimited dangers, necessity will permit the removal of restrictions, particularly since the southern republics of the Soviet Union are Islamic, at least in name. They are also Shi'ite.

4. Under such circumstances what was an impossible Soviet shift for 'Abd-al-'Abd-al-Nasir's Egypt would become more than easy for Khomeyni's Iran.

Iran is much closer to the Soviet Union.

Iran is much more useful to the Soviet Union as far as its ostensible message is concerned. It is Islamic, not Marxist and it is religious, not atheistic. Embraced by an ally, Iran will have more power to fan out and achieve victory in the surrounding area. At first, Iran would be the front for the Soviet Union, the hidden power behind Iran. Ultimately, it would become a conspicuous power in its own right.

This is particularly true since the Tudeh Communist Party lost only a few of its leaders. The Tudeh Communist Party had actually become allied with the regime of Imam Ruhollah Khomeyni for a long period of time.

A Final Look at the Map of the Area

The Soviet Union is using Libya as a base from which it could go out into the Arab Maghreb in one direction and also eastward into Egypt and through Chad to Sudan.

The Soviet Union is using Ethiopia as a base from which it can set out in a westerly direction toward Sudan, Zaire, Kenya, and of course Egypt.

The Soviet Union is using Afghanistan as a stepping stone. The next deferred step will be into Pakistan. This will be followed by Iran, a step to be taken to control the Arabian Gulf.

The Soviet Union is in the Red Sea by virtue of its heavy presence in Ethiopia

and its possible presence in Sudan. Such a presence would have a fatal effect on Egypt and on Sudan if dams were built on the course of the Nile in the south-eastern planes of Sudan.

The question after all that is this: what is the way out?

To say the least, the way out that is available has not proven itself to be fully successful. A naval presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Mediterranean Sea did not prove to be useful.

Nor did a direct military presence in Lebanon prove to be useful. The military alliance with the countries of the Arabian Gulf, with Morocco and Tunisia did not stop the malignant Soviet encroachment from achieving its objectives.

The way out can be found in a regional security system that is derived from the area and overlooks all considerations but those of regional security first and foremost.

The way out can be found in a national security system under which all human resources can be united and streamlined with the geographical location, the ability to finance the acquisition of weapons and an adequate backup.

The way out can be found in a regional security system in the area that would reconsider the geographical position of the countries of the area with regard to their proximity to the locations of a Soviet attack. The areas in the region would then be reclassified as advance and rear positions for defense.

The way out can be found in a regional defense system that would include in one stage Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the countries of the Gulf and Jordan. In a subsequent stage it would include North Yemen and Somalia.

The way out can be found in a defense system that would not ignore the universal Israeli threat even as it takes into account the urgent Soviet threat which is finding its way into the area through several routes.

--Through the Shi'ite ideology coming out of the outskirts of the Gulf.

--Through the confused ideology coming out of the outskirts of the Arab Maghreb and West Africa. That area is represented by the colonel's Libya.

Has the analysis gone beyond reason? It may have, but it did not err in its efforts to trace history when the Islamic state was threatened by the danger of an attack by the Tatars and the Moguls. This danger is coming today from the same source although its perpetrators are the same Tatars and the same Moguls who today have different names, different allies and different fronts.

The Libyan Air Raid on Omdurman: an Example in Action

While this study was being prepared for the press, the air raid on Umm Durman took place. The importance of concluding this study with a reference to this incident lies in the fact that the incident is considered an example in action of how far Libya has gone.

--The incident was a model of escalation whose aim was to go beyond being an equal defensive measure, in terms of quantity and quality.

--The incident was a model of provocation where an action was not commensurate with a reaction whose direct consequences and objectives are calculated.

--The incident was a model for expanding the base and scope of the confrontation, bringing it out of a regional context into an international one. The conflict would cease to be regional, and it would become international.

An unbiased look at the objectives Libya had hoped to accomplish from the air raid that failed leads one to conclude that hardly any objective would have been realized even if the air raid had succeeded in achieving its obvious objectives. Even if one were to assume that the main building of Sudan's radio broadcast services in Umm Durman had been destroyed, that would not have prevented Sudan's radio services from continuing their broadcasts via alternative radio stations.

Even if one were to assume that citizens would have been alarmed, that alarm would not have lasted long. As a rule foreign aggression unites the domestic front, and being subjected to danger would automatically awaken a sense of disdain for danger. This is evident in Lebanon whose people are coexisting with bombs that are being hurled at them daily from the air, from land and from the sea. On the other side signs of the failure of the Libyan air raid on Omdurman are manifested in the following:

First, Libya had somewhat proudly acknowledged its responsibility for the air raid. That acknowledgement came in the form of a promotion for the two pilots who carried out the unsuccessful air raid. In addition, Libya made a deliberate contact with Cairo and announced that it had planned the air raid and that the raiding airplane had taken off from Libyan territory and had returned to Libya.

Second, Libya ought to be one of the first countries to realize that air space in the area and in the entire world, although not closed to infiltration by aircraft, is being watched by satellites which photograph everything that takes place in the air all hours of the day and night. Therefore, the Libyan airplane was under observation and was being photographed from the time it took off from its base in al-Kafrah in Libya until it returned to that base. This is undeniable evidence.

Third, the propaganda objective of declaring that the air raid was a domestic Sudanese action was thus foiled.

Fourth, before the air raid on Sudan some western media agencies did not think of Libya as being fully involved in the sabotage incidents that were seen in some areas of development in south Sudan. However, after the air raid Libya asserted that it was fully involved in these events and that it was completely responsible for them. While talking about the air raid on Omdurman, political leaders in Libya faltered in their explanations.

One time media agencies would attribute sabotage incidents to what they called

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the Sudanese Deliverance Front, and another time they would attribute the incidents to what they called the liberals in south Sudan. Finally, Libya recognized its full responsibility for the raid in the sense of acknowledging its primary participation in the activities of those groups.

Fifth, despite any explanations that may be offered by Libya in making a distinction between its social and political course and its alliance with the Soviet Union, this distinction disappears and disintegrates with Libya's acknowledgement of responsibility for the air raid on Omdurman on the one hand and its cooperation, on the other hand, with those it calls the Deliverance Front or the liberals of south Sudan.

This is because the Libyan air raid on Omdurman came at a time when Sudan was going through [what may be described as] labor pains. Sudan was changing the western mode for the body of its laws in the country to the Islamic mode, which would be the force that would be directing its legislation and its laws. This was an experience that could only be overcome with stability. In the absence of stability such a shift could have been aborted.

No objective could be attributed to the Libyan air raid on Omdurman except that of undermining stability. From Libya's viewpoint that was an objective that was either actually achieved or not.

On the other hand, Libya which has been boasting of the activities of those it calls the Deliverance Front or the liberals of south Sudan does not deny those people's declaration of themselves as a Marxist-Leninist organization, nor does it denounce them for it.

Sixth, although the Libyan air raid on Omdurman failed to achieve its propaganda or political objectives, it did succeed fully in destroying the steps that were being taken to bring about a rapprochement between Sudan and Libya on the one hand and between Egypt and Libya on the other.

As far as Sudan was concerned, more than one mediation effort was made to bring about a kind of rapprochement between Khartoum and Tripoli.

An Arab initiative was undertaken to arrange for a meeting between me and Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. I recall that I set a condition that the meeting take place in the holy city of Mecca so that the meeting would be one in which promises would be made in the sight of God and in His holy shrine. Such promises would neither be withdrawn, nor would there be any treachery in the context of such a meeting.

There was also a Libyan initiative. Although Sudan turned down that initiative at the time, the initiative continued to be considered as an indication of Libya's inclination for a rapprochement. What is more important is that the initiative included Libya's admission of involvement in anti-Sudanese activity in south Sudan.

This initiative may be summarized in a proposal that was made by 'Abd-al-Salam al-Jalud at the Islamic Summit in Casablanca early this year. Mr al-Jalud proposed that Libya would give up its support for sabotage activity in south Sudan

and that it would even turn over members of the Sudanese opposition abroad to Khartoum in return for Sudan's silence at the Islamic summit on the subject of Egypt's reinstantement in the Islamic Conference Organization.

As far as Egypt was concerned, there was a series of initiatives and communications with President Husni Mubarak. These were carried out by Libya's leaders through Muhammad Qadhdhaf al-Damm, Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi's cousin. These were the communications that Cairo had seen more than once and that al-Rabat had seen during President Husni Mubarak's recent visit to Morocco.

Libya invited Egypt not only to carry out a rapprochement with it, but also to unite with it. That would be done in the well-known Libyan style of Libyan processions crossing the borders with Egypt and imposing unity on the Egyptian people and on Egyptian leaders.

All this places the Libyan air raid on Omdurman in the context of objectives whose strategic returns contradict its tactical results. They even contradict its immediate tactical objectives.

The raid on Omdurman meant the destruction of all attempts for a rapprochement with Khartoum. It meant placing relations between Libya and Sudan in the position they were in on the eve of the Libyan attempt to invade Sudan in July 1976.

The raid on Omdurman also meant the destruction of all claims about Libya's inclination to unite with Egypt. When the city of Omdurman is subjected to a Libyan attack, it would be impossible for Cairo to give serious consideration to al-Qadhdhafi's claims that he wishes to unite with Egypt.

It is in this context that a series of Libyan measures that targeted Cairo after the air raid on Omdurman may be viewed. It is enough to refer to these measures to provide evidence of their objectives. These measures were as follows:

First, Tripoli had voluntarily communicated with Cairo and had informed political leaders there that it had carried out the air raid on the Sudanese city. That admission would produce distance and not a rapprochement between Cairo and Tripoli, not to mention unity. Libya acknowledged this action despite its talk about the united course and about preparations for that course.

Second, Tripoli had admitted that its political leaders had made demands which had aroused feelings of patriotism in Egypt and in Sudan.

When Libya asks for ducts or pipes to be laid so these would carry to Libya its share of the waters of the Nile, it makes that request as though it were entitled to that water even though it is not one of the countries of the Nile basin. It would thus be placing Egypt, Sudan and the rest of the countries of the Nile basin in the forefront of hostile intentions targeting the principal source of life, which is water. Despite Libya's claims of seeking unity, its intentions are hostile.

Third, Egypt, Sudan and the whole world know that it was Libya that was behind the sabotage activity that had been targeting the Jonglei Canal Project ever since its early beginnings.

Libya was behind the provocation effort that was being mounted against the project in south Sudan. Using its agents, it spread the rumor that the project was being carried out in preparation for broad scale Egyptian immigration to south Sudan. Libyan agents spread the rumor that if the project were implemented, it would cause environmental and climatic changes in the area surrounding the canal. The limited opposition to the project, which was created at the instigation of Libya, was eliminated on the one hand by educating people and on the other hand by universal scientific expertise. This expertise proved that in addition to saving millions of cubic meters of water that used to be lost from the swamps through evaporation, the project will create a suitable environment for farming and grazing. This would improve the area of the project economically and socially. In addition, it would bring about an additional yield from the Nile that would benefit agriculture in both Sudan and Egypt. Furthermore, it would facilitate river navigation through the canal, and it would link parts of the south with a land route.

Libya then was behind the sabotage activity whose aim was to stop the work that was being done on the last stages of the Jonglei Project to complete it. Elements loyal to Libya and funded by it would infiltrate the project area and would take foreigners working on the project as hostages. Libyan activity then was targeting Egypt and Sudan simultaneously. In fact, Libyan activity targeted Egyptian-Sudanese integration directly so as to impede it and abort its outcome at an early stage before its effects would become evident to the peoples of both Egypt and Sudan.

In spite of that, or rather because of it, it would be difficult to look at the strategic objective of Libya's raid on Omdurman in the context of these objectives alone at least.

A number of possibilities may be presented in looking at the reactions that may be counted upon in the planning stages for such a raid and as a result of it. Some of these are definite, and some are possible as follows:

Definite Possibilities

That the mutual defense treaty between Egypt and Sudan would be implemented immediately. This is the agreement that was signed by the two countries in 1976. It was the direct result of Libya's attempt to invade Sudan in July of that year. It was also in addition to the tensions between Egypt and Libya which existed prior to that date. These are the tensions that reached the point of an armed confrontation between the two countries afterwards.

Even without a mutual defense treaty between Egypt and Sudan, the reality of common security and common grounds between Egypt and Sudan would have required [Egypt to rush to Sudan's aid and vice versa] due to the geographic, cultural and human affinity that exists between the two countries. From that perspective the Libyan air raid on Omdurman constitutes aggression against both countries simultaneously, and it requires both countries to confront that aggression as well.

The Libyan air raid on the Sudanese city of Omdurman signified in a direct way a

serious escalation and a certain threat to security in the entire area. Except for the Israeli air raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor in Baghdad, it was the first action of its kind to be carried out in this manner. It was the first air raid within this range regarding the length of the flight from al-Kafrah to Omdurman and back. The air raid was carried out by a Soviet-made aircraft and by pilots who were trained by the Soviets. Their operations and plans for those operations are managed by the Soviets also.

In addition, the operation constituted at least indirect friction between the parties to the international conflict. This requires being alert at least to the sources of danger to regional security on the one hand and to the sources of danger to international security on the other, particularly since Sudan is located in an area of international tensions both in Africa and in the Arab world as well.

Although the consequences of the Libyan air raid on Omdurman were considered during the planning stage for the raid with regard to the regional defense requirements that would become necessary against the perpetrator of that raid, it is also possible to consider the consequences of that raid on international defense against its perpetrator also. Not only is that perpetrator considered a source of threat to the security of the area, but also a base for what is a broader and a bigger source of threat, a threat that goes beyond the size of Libya and its capabilities, both its offensive and defensive capabilities at the same time.

By taking into account the action and the reactions to it and by taking into account preliminaries and consequences, the strategic objective of the Libyan air raid on Omdurman can be seen as [follows]:

--Libya sought to induce an attack that would go beyond its offensive capabilities.

--Libya would be exposed to an attack that would be beyond its defense capabilities.

In both cases, inducing an attack and being exposed to one, Libya would have no choice but to strengthen its ties with the superpowers that are allied with it. Such strengthening of relations would go beyond the boundaries of cooperation and would become an alliance.

This is what Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi announced less than 2 weeks after his air raid on the city of Omdurman. Al-Qadhdhafi stated that Libya had entered into a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union.

Thus the new Soviet strategy in the area or rather in the world would go into another stage of application: the stage of inducing aggression to a point that goes beyond offensive capabilities and exposing oneself to counterattack beyond one's defense capabilities. It is through this gap that the Soviets would establish their influence and their presence, turning themselves from a friend to an ally and from a helping force to a primary force or rather an alternative force that would go out seeking other locations. The Soviet Union is always working without a front, and it takes action to achieve its ambitions in a

blatant manner sometimes and in a clandestine manner other times.

This was the case in Afghanistan, and this is the case in Libya.

This is what the Soviet Union will do tomorrow or the day after in this or the other country.

This is what the Soviet Union will do in countries that at the inducement of the Soviets will rush headlong into actions that are beyond their capabilities, thereby exposing themselves to a situation in which they could become a base and a staging ground for the Soviets which they can use to launch their activities in surrounding areas.

[Afterword]

A Strategic View

The Institute of Political and Strategic Studies is pleased to commence its efforts in the area of strategic studies with this valuable detailed study that was prepared by Field Marshal Ja'far Muhammad Numayri, the minister of defense and the commander in chief of Sudan's armed forces.

This study is about the strategy of threats to the security of the Middle East in the eighties.

This study draws its gravity and its importance at this stage from several factors. The most important of these factors, and this is not an exhaustive listing of them, may be as follows:

--Because of his education, expertise and experience and because of his interest and his being in a position of responsibility, the author of this study has acquired a profound and a broad knowledge of the treatment of strategic questions in both the political and military areas.

--The Middle East area has been and will continue to be for various numerous reasons one of the most dangerous keys to international strategy, both economically and militarily. It is one of the most important areas for the race to polarize, control and dominate the world.

--We in Sudan constitute a vital and a throbbing part of this area. We occupy both a vital location in it and an important part of it.

--Ever since it began, the decade of the eighties has been promising that its years will be full of innovations and changes. Signs indicate that this decade will be full of struggles and conflicts and that it will abound in all forms of threat and different kinds of influences on questions of strategic security throughout the globe in general and in this area in particular.
Consequently, the institute is pleased to offer students and all interested persons this valuable study.

We are all confident that it will receive the attention, care and thought it deserves and that it will spawn worthwhile studies, dialogue and exchange of ideas.

The purpose we are seeking is known to God.

The Institute of Political and Strategic Studies

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